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EQUITABLE PROTECTION OF BUSINESS AND BUSINESS RIGHTS.
By VILLIA3 Q. DE FUNIAK*
The right to carry on a lawful business is recognized in
equity as a property right or as a substantial right having a
pecuniary value which is in the nature of a property right.'
Indeed, since most of us cannot be fortunate enough to carry on
an independent business or own a business with a physical plant
of some kind but must depend upon our labor or employment in
the business of someone else, the power of an individual to earn
a living or to exercise a trade, calling or profession is equally
a property right. It is a property right which has as much
value and importance to the individual as the right to carry on
a lawful business has to the one owning a business. This has
also come to be recognized in equity. 2 Accordingly, pursuant
to the principles applied in equity, a wrongful interference
with the carrying on of a lawful business or with the exercise of
a lawful trade, calling or profession is an injury to property
which may be enjoined where the recovery of damages for the
wrongful interference does not provide an adequate remedy.
If the wrongful interference, as is usually the case, is
continuing so as to require successive actions for damages, none
of which will in itself serve to bring about a discontinuance of
the wrong, or the extent of the pecuniary loss caused is impossible of ascertainment, and the injury may be described as
irreparable, it is clear that the remedy at law is inadequate and
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco.

'See WALSH, TREATISE ON EQUITY (1930), Secs. 41, 44; Pound,
Equitable Relief Against Defamation (1916) 29 HARV. L. REV. 640.

2
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131, L.R.A.
1916D 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B 283 (1915); Grand International Brotherhood v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 21 P. 2d 971 (1934); Standard Oil Co. v.
Beretelsen, 186 Minn. 483, 243 N.W. 701 (1932); Gurtov v. Williams,
105 S.W. 2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) writ of error refused.
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the case is one for the exercise of equitable restraints. 3 Not only
can equity prevent the continuation of the wrong which will result in irreparable injury to or complete destruction of the business, it can also, to the extent that it is feasible in the particular
case, award damages for the injury so far incurred or require
an accounting for profits 'made by a competitor through his
4
wrongful acts, according to the practice in the jurisdiction.
Although not within the scope of. this work, it may be noticed
that under the Federal Trade Commission Act, resort may be
had to the Federal Trade Commission to obtain restraint of unfair methods of competition by those engaged in interstate commerce. This restraint is accomplished by the Commission, after
a hearing, issuing what is known as a "cease and desist" order.5
Injuries to the carrying on of a lawful business, to which
most of the cases relate, may involve direct injuries committed
by noncompetitors or direct or indirect injuries of various sorts
committed by competitors. It is immaterial whether the wrong
results from a desire to profit in a competing business or merely
from a desire to injure the plaintiff.0 The term "unfair competition" is used to designate, under a general head, the various
sorts of wrongful interferences or acts by competitors. However,
it is frequently extended to cover any acts, whether by a competitor or noncompetitor, which injure a business or business
rights.7 Since the successful operation of a lawful business or
earning a living may depend upon the exclusive possession and
use of trade secrets, patents, copyrights, trademarks, and matters
of similar nature, the unauthorized appropriation and use of or
wrongful interference with any of these incidents or assets of a
business to its detriment warrants equitable intervention. It
becomes immaterial whether any one of these various things is
describable as property in itself. The wrong in using,-appropriating or interfering with them is an injury to the right to
' See WALsn, TREATISE ON EQUITY (1930), Sec. 44.
' See Nims, Damages and Accounting Procedure in Unfair CQm-

petition Cases (1946) 31 CORN. L. Q. 431.
* U.S. Code, Title 15, Sec. 45.
* While involving action for damages rather than for equitable
relief, the case of Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909),
is worthy of notice. Defendant, a wealthy banker, set up a rival
barber shop and ran it at a loss for the express purpose of destroying
the plaintiff's business.
"See Callman, What is Unfair Competition (1940) 28 GEORGETOwN L. J. 585.
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carry on a lawful b.usiness or to earn a living and that right supplies the property right or substantive right which is so frequently said to be a requisite .of equity jurisdiction,
CRI3NxAL ACTS

In the succeeding part of this article are instances of acts
which are crimes and also injuriously affect the carrying on
of a business or the earning of a living.8 Since these instances
are not all-inclusive, it is deemed advisable at this point to state
the principles which govern in such situations.
It is well settled that equity does not interfere by injunction to prevent the commission of criminal acts, on the ground
alone of their criminality. The enforcement of the criminal
laws is ordinarily left to be effectuated by criminal procedure.
But where the commission of a criminal act will cause irreparable injury to property or property rights or to substantial rights
having a pecuniary value which are in the nature of property,
and the criminal proceeding will only be. effective to. impose
punishment for the criminal act after-its commission, equity will
interpose to prevent its commission and the consequent irreparable injury. Thus, acts which are crimes but which, if permitted
to occur or to continue, will cause irreparable injury to the
carrying on of a business or to the right to earn a living, will be
enjoined.9 The criminal act may be one committed or about to
be committed by a noncompetitor but nevertheless for the direct
purpose of injuring the plaintiff's business or his right to earn
a living.", If the criminal act is committed by a competitor it
amounts to unfair competition. 1
The situation may be such
8
E.g., operating without license or franchise in competition with
holder of franchise or license; libelous statements injurious to
business.
ISee cases in notes following. That no special injury was suffered by plaintiff from competing automobile dealer keeping open in
violation of Sunday law, see Motor Car Dealers' Ass'n v. Fred S.
Haines Co., 128 Wash. 267, 222 P. 611, 36 A.L.R. 493 (1924).
" Examples of this situation occur in labor disputes, as for instance where picketing is accompanied by illegal acts injurious to
employer's business.
I Farmers Co-operative Ass'n v. Quaker Oats Co., 7 N.W. 2d 906
(Iowa 1943); Seifert v. Buhl Optical Co., 276 Mich. 692, 268 N.W.
784 (1936), noted (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 497; Glover v. Malloska,
238 Mich. 216, 213 N.W. 107, 52 A.L.R. 77 (1927); Puget Sound, etc.,
Co. v. Grassmeyer, 102 Wash. 482, 173 P. 504, L.R.A. 1918F 469 (1918).
See annotation, Right to enjoin rival or competitor from illegal
acts or practices amounting to a crime, 52 A.L.R. 79.
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that the plaintiff cannot successfully combat the competition
except on the plane where it has been pitched by the defendant
and this he cannot attempt without himself becoming a violator
of the law. 1 2 Or the situation may be such that the business
of the plaintiff is being strangled by a criminal monopoly or
combination or other acts in restraint of trade.' 3 Where the
delays and burdens inherent in the prosecution of the criminal
acts threaten irreparable injury before the prosecutions can even
be instituted, much less brought to a successful conclusion,
equity affords the only speedy and effective relief. This may
be particularly true where the number of offending competitors
is so great as to render the institution of criminal proceedings
14
exceedingly difficult and time-consuming.
COPYRIGHTS

A copyright may be defined, somewhat generally, as the
exclusive right one has to print, publish and sell a production
of the mind, whether a writing, musical composition, drawing,
design or the like. 15 While it was declared at one time in England that the right one had in his production or composition
was a right of property at common law, independent of statute, 1
this was shottly thereafter denied, 17 and this would seem to be
consistent with the legal history of the subject which shows that
it developed under statutory protection, in so far as there is a
protectible right after general publication.' s
" Featherstone v. Independent Service Station Ass'n, 10 S.W. 2d
124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
1 Farmers Co-operative Ass'n v. Quaker Oats Co., 7 N.W. 2d 906
(Iowa 1943).
Restraints and monopolies as crimes under federal laws, ee
Sherman Anti-Trust Act and Clayton Act, U.S. Code, Title 15. The
Clayton Act expressly authorizes suit by a private person for inrelief.
junctive
1
Featherstone v. Independent Service Station Ass'n, supra n. 12.
!MERWIN, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (1895), p. 457; MOORE, CYC.
LAW16DICT. (3d ed.).
Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201.
17Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 4 Burr. 2408, 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 1
Eng. Rep. 837.
It was again denied in a 5 to 4 decision in Jeffreys v. Boosey,
(1854) 4 H.L.C. 815, 10 Eng. Rep. 681. Walsh, in his Treatise on
Equity, p. 216, note, erroneously states that a majority favored the
view of a common law property right.
"With the rise and development of printing in England, the
printers and other allied crafts associated together in the Stationers
Company which was incorporated in 1556 and which was entrusted

PBOTECTION Or BusINSS

In this country we recognize both a common law copyright
and a copyright by statute. They are, however, fundamentally
distinguishable and together make up one whole. At common
law, an author is recognized as having a property right (which
is transferable) in his production until he dedicates it to the
public by a general publication. He is entitled to the aid of
equity to prevent the unauthorized use or publication of his
property by another prior to his own dedication of it by a
general publication. It will be seen that he is assured the exclusive right of first general publication.1 9 The production of
the mind must be actually reduced to concrete form. Otherwise
it is a mere idea or abstract idea, which presents another question dealt with below. Once he has dedicated it to the public by
a general publication, the author thereupon loses his common
law property right and anyone may thereafter copy, publish and
sell the production or composition, in the absence of further
protection provided by statute.20
by law with general supervision of publishing and dealing in books.
With some exceptions, publishers registered their books with the
Company which saw to it that no one else infringed on their exclusive right of publication and multiplication. Subsequent developments brought about the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1709.
See Holdsworth Press Control and Copyright in the 16th and 17th
Centuries (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 841. See also articles by Rogers, Some
Historical Matter Concerning Literary Property (1908) 7 Mich. L.
Rev. 101; A Chapter in the History of Literary Property: The Booksellers' Fight for Perpetual Copyright (1911) 5 II. L. Rev. 551.
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 Fed. 15 (1906), noted (1906)
6 COL. L. REV. 50, (1906) 19 HAIV. L. REV. 125; Loew's, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 18 Cal. 2d 419, 115 P. 2d 983 (1941); Frohman v.
Ferris, 238 Ill. 430, 87 N.E. 327, 43 L.R.A.N.S. 639, 128 Am. St. Rep.
135 (1909), aff'd (1912) 223 U.S. 424, 32 S. Ct. 263, 56 L. Ed. 492.
See Kelley, Rights of Authors and Artists Outside the Copyright
Law (1919) 5 CORN. L. Q. 48; WALSH, EQUITY, Sec. 42.
This common law copyright is incorporated into the statutes of
some states. See CAL. CIv. CODE, sec. 980 et seq.
' See cases cited, supra, n. 19. What constitutes a dedication to
the public or a general publication is not always easily determinable.
It is settled that delivery or presentation of the product of the mind
before a limited or selected group or class is not a dedication to the
public. If delivered or presented at a meeting open to the general
public, there is a dedication or general publication. As to reading
report before professional society, see New Jersey State Dental Soc.
v. Dentacura Co., 57 N.J. Eq. 539, 41 A. 672 (1898); delivering lecture,
Nutt v. National Institute, 31 F. 2d 236 (1929); displaying dress design, Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 114
F. 2d 80 (1940), aff'd 312 U.S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 703, 85 L. Ed. 949 (1941),
noted (1941) 35 ILL. L. REV. 546, (1940) 27 VA. L. REV. 230; musical
composition, Arnstein v. Edw. B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F. 2d 275
(1936); reading script over radio, Uproar Co. v. National Broad-

KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL

It is at this point of general publication that the statutory
copyright becomes effegtive. Under the federal laws governing
copyright, the author upon compliance therewith obtains the
exclusive right for a limited period to publish his production or,
as it is sometimes expressed, the right to multiply copies to the
exclusion of others. 2 1 This exclusive right or monopoly granted
by statute is naturally a valuable asset in a commercial sense.
It may be protected by equitable remedies against infringement or plagiarism where remedy by way. of damages is inadequate. Since it is usually very difficult to determine at law
to what extent there has been injury or loss from infringement
or plagiarism, equitable relief may be particularly called for.22
The relief may include restraint of further publication and sale
of the infringing work and likewise an accounting of all profits
made through the infringement and the surrender of the infringing copies and the means of making them.2 3 This relief
must be sought in the federal courts since the state courts do
not have jurisdiction of suits arising under the federal copy24
right laws.
Even though an author avails himself of the protection of
the federal copyright laws, his general publication remains a
surrender of his common law property right. Upon the expiration of the statutory period of protection, his common law property right does not revive. 25 Even without a general publication, the copyrighting of one's literary property under the
federal statute is said to constitute an election to protect one's
right of property by means of the remedies afforded by the
casting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (1934), modified and aff'd 81 F. 2d 373

(1936); broadcasting news obtained from press agency for distribu-

tion to newspapers, annotation, 104 A.L.R. 876. Cf. situation as to

presentation of dramatic composition, Ferris v. Frohman, supra, n. 19.
nBobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus; Loew's, Inc. v. Superior Court,
supra, n. 19.

See MERWIN, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, p. 460. Discussion of the
various types of infringements of exclusive rights obtained under the
federal copyright laws is not within the scope of this article. Reference may be had to general treatises on the subject. See also Call-

man, Copyright and Unfair Competition (1940) 2 LA. L. REV. 648;
Driscoll, Copyright Infringement (1942) 11 FORDHAM L. REv. 63;
Young, Copyright Law (1940) 28 Ky. L. J. 447; Linck, Copyright
Law Applied to Radio Broadcasting (1943) 19 NOTRE DAME LAW. 13.
U.S. Code, Title 17, Sec. 25.
"See CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE (2d ed.), Secs. 102,
241-245; Loew's, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, n. 19.
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, supra, n. 19.
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statute and to be a surrender of one's common law property
right and the protection afforded by it.26
PATENTS

Although the word "patents" has other meanings, it is
used here in its more usual meaning of those instruments by
which the United States secures to inventors for a limited period
27
the exclusive use of their own inventions.
As in the case of literary property, the inventor who has
reduced his idea to concrete form, as a diagram, design, or the
like, has a common law property right therein which is protectible in equity against unauthorized use prior to any general
publication or marketing of the invention. The federal patent
laws, as in the case of the federal copyright laws, afford him
protection thereafter. Since the exclusive right or monopoly
secured by the patenting under the federal statutes is a substantial right having a pecuniary value, equitable relief may be
resorted to for the purpose of restraining infringements of this
right to the irreparable injury of the patentee or his assignees.
Remedy by way of damages is inadequate where the infringment
is continuing and successive actions for damages would be necessitated, none of which would be effective, of course, to bring
the infringement to a close. Equitable relief may also include
an accounting for the profits. 23 The relief must be sought in
the federal courts for the state courts are excluded from jurisdiction of cases arising under the patent laws. 29
If question arises as to the validity of the plaintiff's patent,
that question can be disposed of by the court, 30 whatever may
have been the rule in the past or in England requiring establishnient of the validity of the patent in a prior action at law. 31
Loew's, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, n. 19, noted (1941) 15
So. CAL. L. REv. 104.

'MoORE, Cyc. LAW DICT. (3d ed.).
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S.
405, 28 S. Ct. 748, 52 L. Ed. 1122 (1906), noted (1907) 7 COL. L. REV.
433, (1907) 20 HARv. L. REV. 638, (1907) 18 YALE L. J. 52; Waterman
v.McKenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 11 S.Ct. 334, 34 L. Ed. 923 (1891), distinguishing license from assignment.
' See CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE (2d ed.), Sees. 102,
241-245.
'Effect of procedural fusion of law and equity in federal courts,
see CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE (2d ed.), Sec. 781 et seq.
-'As to former rule, see WALSH, EQUITY, See. 43, citing Chafee,
CASES ON EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST TORTS (1924), p. 67, and AMES,
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Upon final decree granting a permanent or perpetual injunction
against infringement of the patent, permanent or perpetual
32
means until the expiration of the patent.
In this country it is immaterial that the owner of the patent
right is not exercising his rights under the patent. Non-use by
33
the patentee does not justify use of the patent by another,
even though he is willing to pay a reasonable value as fixed by a
court for a license to use the patent. 34 On the other hand, if
the patentee is using his patent to the detriment of the public
interest, for example to create a monopoly or to restrain competition, equity will not afford him relief against an
35
infringement.
FRANCHISES OF LICENSES

In the sense that a franchise or license is a special privilege
or grant by the government to a person or corporation to carry
on some business, occupation or profession which is not a matter
of common right,36 it is usually considered by equity as a right
of property or as a substantial right having a pecuniary value
which is in the nature of a property right. This is true even
though the franchise or license is not an exclusive one. 37 One
who wrongfully interferes with the exercise of the franchise or
license or unlawfully competes with the franchise or license
CASES ON EQUITY (1904), p. 629, n. 1. Exceptions existing under

former rule, see McCoy v. Nelson, 121 U.S. 484, 7 S. Ct. 1000, 30
L. Ed. 1017 (1887).
Effect of near approach
'2 MERWN, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, p. 444.
of time of expiration or expiration pending suit, see 40 Am. Jun.,
Patents, Sec. 178.
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., supra,
n. 28. Statutory rule in England, see 9 and 10 Geo. V, Sec. 27
(1919); note, (1907) 20 HARV. L. REV. 638.
"Campbell Printing Press & Mfg. Co. v. Manhattan Ry. Co.,
49 Fed. 930 (1892).
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64
S. Ct. 268, 88 L. Ed. 376 (1944), rehearing denied 321 U.S. 802, 64
S. Ct. 525, 88 L. Ed. 1089 (1944), noted (1944) 57 HARV. L. REV. 574,
900.
" See MOORE, Cyc. LAW DICT., (3d ed.). Common right to engage in particular business, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 52 S. Ct. 371, 76 L. Ed. 747 (1932).
" Frost v. Corporation Commission (Oklahoma), 278 U.S. 515,
49 S. Ct. 235, 73 L. Ed. 483 (1929); Phenix City v. Alabama Power
Co., 239 Ala. 537, 195 So. 894 (1940); Puget Sound, etc., Co. v.
Grassmeyer, 102 Wash. 482, 173 P. 504, L.R.A. 1918F 469 (1918).
Liquor dealer's license not property so as to be within jurisdiction of equity, see State ex rel. Zeller v. Montgomery Circuit
Court, (Ind. 1945) 62 N.E. 2d 149, noted (1946) 46 COL. L. REV. 301.
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holder to his injury may be restrained in equity where there is
no other adequate remedy. 38 It will be noticed that the wrong
is either in the nature of unfair competition or is in the nature
of a nuisance or trespass.
Where the franchise or license is an exclusive one, any
competition is necessarily without authority of law and may be
classified as wrongful. It is obvious that it must cause damage
or injury to the franchise holder. Where the wrong is continuing it is undoubtedly one which will result in irreparable
injury for which damages alone will not be adequate. Likewise,
a resort to a criminal proceeding may not provide a sufficiently
prompt and efficacious remedy which will prevent irreparable
injury. 30 Even though the franchise or license is not exclusive,
the franchise or license holder may enjoin one who competes
against him without authority or unlawfully, where he can show
that he suffers irreparable injury or special damage therefrom
for which there is no other adequate remedy. 40 For example,
although those competing against him may be doing so unlawfully, they may be so numerous and the circumstances may be
such that the prosecution of criminal actions against them may
41
not be so speedy or so efficacious as the equitable remedy.
Although there is modern authority that one holding a nonexclusive franchise cannot enjoin unauthorized competition, this
'Frost v. Corporation Commission, supra, n. 37 (unauthorized
competition); Boise Street Car Co. v. Van Avery, 61 Ida. 502, 10
P. 2d 1107 (1940) (wrongful interference by others than competitors); Moundsville Water Co. v. Moundsville Sand Co., 124 W.
Va. 118, 19 S.E. 2d 217, 139 A.L.R. 1199 (1942) (unlawful obstructions and continuous trespasses).
Franchise or license to practice law or other profession is a
property right protectible against infringement causing irreparable
injury. Seifert v. Buhl Optical Co., supra, n. 11; Unger v. Landlords' Management Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 68, 168 A. 229 (1933), noted
(1933) 18 Mnf-. L. Rav. 227; Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582,
254 N.W. 910 (1934); Devorken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n,
38 Oh. App. 265, 176 N.E. 577 (1931). But see Steinberg v. McKay,
3 N.E. 2d 23 (Mass. 1936).
See annotations, Right to enjoin practice of profession or conduct of business without license, 81 A.L.R. 292, 92 A.L.R. 173.
"Denver & R.G.W. Ry. Co. v. Linck, 56 F. 2d 957 (1932); City
Sanitary Service Co. v. Rausch, 10 Wash. 2d 446, 117 P. 2d 225
(1941).
'Frost v. Corporation Commission, supra, n. 37; Farmers &
Merchants Co-op. Tel. Co. v. Boswell Tel. Co., 187 Ind. 371, 119 N.E.
513 (1918), noted (1918) 32 HARv. L. RaV. 84; Puget Sound, etc., Co.
supra, n. 37.
v. Grassmeyer,
1
" See Puget Sound, etc., Co. v. Grassmeyer, supra, n. 37.
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will usually be fdund to be based on the fact that no actual oi
irreparable injury was shown, or on the fact that the right is
reserved, by statute, in the state, through a proper representative, to enjoin unauthorized operation by public service com42
panies, ultra vires acts of corporations, or the like.
'Whether or not a franchise is exclusive, the franchise holder
is entitled to injunctive relief against one unlawfully obstructing
the franchise holder in the performance of its functions or continuously committing trespasses, to the irreparable injtu'y of
43
the franchise holder.
TRADE SECRETS

A trade secret is some secret compound, process, formula,
device, list or data, or the like, used in a business and known
only to the owner and to such employees to whom it must be
made known in order to use it."4 Whether trade secrets are, in
themselves, property has been the subject of dispute. 4: However
that may be, they do have a definite value as incidents of the
business in which they exist and are used. To the extent that
they add to and increase the profits from the business, the
wrongful use of them by another injures the owner of the
business in his right to carry on a lawful business without wrongful or unreasonable interference. Since a continued wrongful
use or wrongful interference cannot be adequately compensated
by money damages, equity will enjoin disclosure4 6 or use 47 in
12 Baxter Tel. Co. v. Cherokee County
Mut. Tel. Ass'n, 94 Kan.
159, 146 P. 324, L.R.A. 1916B 1083 (1915); Healey v. Sidone, 127 A.
520 (N.J. 1923), noted (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 1088.
That state statutes clearly did not reserve right in state but
expressly gave right to one injured to sue for injunction, see Denver
& R.G.W. Ry. Co., supra, n. 39, pointing out that in any event state
statutes cannot restrict jurisdiction of federal court to grant injunction in proper case.
" Boise Street Car. Co. v. Van Avery; Moundsville Water Co. v.
Moundsville Sand Co., supra, n. 38.
4MOORE,
Cyc. LAW DICT. (3d ed.); 43 C.J.S., Injunctions, Sec.
148; WALSH, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, See. 45. See also REST., TORTS,

Sec. 4757, comment b.

See MCCLINTOCK, HORNBOOK OF EQUITY (1936), Sec. 147;
WALSH, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, Sec. 45; Note, (1919) 19 COL. LAw
REv. 233.
"Riess v. Sanford, 47 Cal. .App. 2d 244, 117 P. 2d 694 (1941)
(species and source of supply of cactus spines used in manufacture
of cactus
phonograph needles).
' 7 Riess v. Sanford, spra, n. 46; Simmons Hardware Co. v.
Waible, 1 S.D. 488, 47 N.W. 814, 11 L.R.A. 267, 36 Am. St. Rep. 755
(1891) (secret price code).
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such cases and, where necessary to give complete relief, order
the restoration or return of the means of knowledge possessed
by the wrongdoer, 4 4 or require an accounting for profits4 9 or
allow damages, 0 according to the practice in the jurisdiction.
Where disclosure or use by former employees is sought to
be enjoined, varying grounds have been given to justify equity
jurisdiction. 51 In some cases, the ground is said to be existence
of a property right in the trade secret, 2- in others the ground
is said to be the breach of contract by the employee, where he
has agreed to secrecy, 53 in others it is said to be the employee's
breach of trust or confidence. 54 The last mentioned seems to be
Frequently, of course, a combithe preferred view today.5
nation of several of these grounds has been said to exist.5 6 However, as already pointed out, it is the injury to the carrying on of
a lawful business, resulting from the wrongful disclosure or
use of the trade secret, that is the basis of the equitable relief.
The breach of contract or of confidence or trust is important in
determining whether the disclosure or use is wrongful.
Just as an employee or former employee may be enjoined,
a third person who is seeking to induce an employee to disclose
a trade secret in violation of his contract with his employer
or in breach of confidence, or who is using a trade secret so
acquired, will be enjoined.5 7 Likewise, one to whom the secret
"Simmons Hardware Co. v. Waibel, supra, n. 47.
See annotation, Right of employer to -have former employee
deliver up information obtained during employment, 93 A.L.R. 1323.
" Irving Iron Works v. Kerlow Steel Flooring Co., 96 N.J. Eq.
702, 126 A. 291 (1924); id., 103 N.J. Eq. 240, 143 A. 145 (1926).
"'See Nims, Damages and Accounting Procedurein Unfair Competition Cases (1946) 31 CORN.L. Q. 431.
1 See McClain, Injunctive Relief against Employees Using Confidential Information (1935) 23 Ky. L. J. 248; Basis of Jurisdiction
for Protectionof Trade Secrets (1919) 19 COL. L. REV. 233.
''The
trade secret as itself a property right, see Peabody v.
Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 96 Am. Dec. 664 (1868); Simmons Hardware
Co. v. Waibel, supra, n. 47.
" Enforcement of negative covenants in contracts of employment
or enjoining their breach is not within the scope of this article.
"'Horn Pond Ice Co. v. Pearson, 267 Mass. 256, 166 N.E. 640
(1929); Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 287,
67 A. 339 (1907).
SSee BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (10th ed.), See. 427;
MCCLINTOcK, HoRNBooK OF EQUITY, Sec. 147.
"See 0. & W. Thum Co. v. Tlocynski, 114 Mich. 149, 72 N.W.
140 (1897), noted (1897) 11 HARV. L. REV. 262.
" Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 70 N.J. Eq. 541, 61 A. 946
(1905); Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. St. 76, 86
A. 688 (1913).
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is revealed in confidence pending licensing negotiations with
him will be enjoined from making an unauthorized use of the
secret.5 8 But one who purchases a trade secret in good faith
without knowledge that it is imparted to him in violation of a
contract or in breach of confidence will not be enjoined from
making use of the secret. 5 9 It is also to be noticed that the
purchaser in good faith of a trade secret has the same right to

have it protected that his vendor had. 0°
ORDINARY KNOWLEDGE OF BUSINESS; NAMES OF OUSTOMERS

It is necessary to distinguish a trade secret from knowledge
gained by an employee which he is free to carry away and use
for himself or in employment by another. Where the knowledge
is such as he would have acquired in any other employment of
the same nature, being common to all businesses of that type,
or where the knowledge is such that anyone could discover it
by mere process of observation, he is entitled to make use of it
for his own benefit or for the benefit of a new employer, even
though this use interferes to some extent with his former employer's business.61 In this respect, the matter causing the
greatest conflict among the courts relates to the acquisition of
knowledge of or the names of customers. To what extent, if at
all, can the employee make use of this knowledge or of these
names to solicit their business for himself or for his new employer
in the absence of any contract not to do so ?62
Where the customers are known to all those engaged in the
same type of business and are customarily solicited by all those
engaged in that business, the employee has obviously obtained
no secret information or data by reason of his contact with these
customers and carries into another employment no information
not already known. This is particularly true in the case of a
"Sandlin v. Johnson, 141 F. 2d 660 (1941).
' Stewart v. Hook, 118 Ga. 445, 45 S.E. 369, 63 L.R.A. 265 (1903).
0 Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 19 Oh. Wkly. Law Bul.
84, 10 Oh. Dec. 154, (1887) per Taft, J.
Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Mosely, 24 Cal. 2d 104, 148
P. 2d 9 (1944), noted (1944) 8 DET. L. J. 39; Victor Chemical Works
v. iliff, 299 Ill. 532, 132 N.E. 806 (1921); Southwest Specialties Co.
v. Eastman, 130 Kan. 443, 286 P. 225 (1930).
1 See annotations, Right in absence of express contract to en-

join former employee from soliciting complainant's customers, 23
A.L.R. 423, 126 A.LR. 758.
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3
salesman employed by a wholesaler to call on the retail dealers.
Similarly, where customers call at the premises of the employer
and the employer has the opportunity to become personally
acquainted with these customers himself or to become acquainted
with them through his other employees and to hold their interest
and their patronage through the exercise of his own personality
and fair dealing or through the personality and fair dealing
of his other employees generally, he is at no disadvantage as
compared with an employee who has had contact with the
customers and then leaves and seeks to obtain their patronage.
The competition for their paironage is on a reasonably equal
basis.'14 However, the situation is entirely different where the
employer has a secret list of customers which is an advantage to
him in his business and the employee, having no or very little
personal contact with these customers, takes away a copy of this
list without permission and begins soliciting their business.6 5

Another variation, that causing the most difficulty, is
where the employee has charge of a laundry or milk route, or the
like, and is the only one who is in personal touch with the
customers who do not know and are not known by the employer
personally and are not known by competitors of the employer.
Can the employee, upon leaving his employment, solicit these
customers for himself or for a new employer? Some courts
hold that the employee can solicit the customers where he takes
with him no written list of the customers,6 6 others that he can
do so even if he takes such a written list with him, 67 others that
he cannot do so where he takes a written list or even though he
takes no such written list.6s The majority of the cases follow
' Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Mosely, supra, n. 61; Boosing
v. Dorman, 148 App. Div. 824, 133 N.Y.S. 910 (1912).
"See Boone v. Krieg, 156 Minn. 83, 194 N.W. 92 (1923) (where
employee took no copy of list of customers with him).
I See United Bakeries v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 2d 150, 53 P. 2d 363
(1936); Boylston Coal Co. v. Rautenbush, 237 Ill. App.550 (1925).
'Progress Laundry Co. v. Hamilton, 208 Ky. 348, 270 S.W. 834
(1925); Garst v. Scott, 114 Kan. 676, 220 P. 277, 34 A.L.R. 395 (1923);
Woolley's Laundry, Inc. v. Silva, 23 N.E. 2d 899, 126 A.L.R. 752
(Mass. 1939).
"De Angeles v. Scauzillo, 287 Mass. 291, 191 N.E. 426 (1934),
noted (1936) 22 VA. L. REV. 359.
People's Coat, etc., Supply Co. v. Light. 171 Apo. Div. 671, 157
N.Y.S. 15 (1916), aff'd 224 N.Y. 727, 121 N.E. 886 (1919); Colonial
Laundries v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 138 A. 47, 54 A.L.R. 343 (1927).
Some courts make the distinction that the' former employee,
though taking no list, can be enjoined from soliciting buf not from

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

the view first expressed. Whatever view is taken by a particular
court depends primarily upon whether it considers the information as to the customers to be of a confidential nature or whether
it considers the information such as to be normally available to
9
or ascertainable by anyone and not of a confidential nature."'
INTERESTS IN IDEAS

In the case of an idea which may have value and utility if
applied or used in a business, but which has not yet been so
applied or used, we come to a matter of some difficulty. Is
there a property right in the idea so as to make it the proper
subject of negotiation and sale? Is there a property right in it
so as to warrant resort to equity to prevent its use by one to
whom it has been revealed for the purpose of interesting him in
its purchase and who thereupon appropriates and uses it without
payment of compensation?7

°

It

is undoubted that uniformly

in the past and widely at the present time it has been considered
that there is no property right in a mere idea. Once uttered it
has been said to be usable by anyone as part of the stock of common knowledge. 71 In itself it cannot be copyrighted or
patented.7 2 But it has come to be considered in many jurisdictions that if it is revealed in confidence or pursuant to contract, its originator may have ground for seeking to protect his
interest in it. The breach of trust or the existing contract right
receiving patronage of the customers. New Method Laundry Co.
v. McCann, 174 Cal. 26, 161 P. 990 (1916); Foster v. Peters, 47 Cal.
App. 2d 203, 117 P. 2d 726 (1941); Brenner v. Stavinsky, 184 Okla.
If he takes a list, he can be
509, 88 P. 2d 613 (1939) (dictum).
enjoined, of course. Mackechnie Bread Co. v. Huber, 60 Cal. App.
539, 213 P. 285 (1923).
See annotation, 126 A.L.R. 758.
See comment, Property in ideas; ideas as subject of contracts
(1946) 31 CoRN. L. Q. 382.
'In Bristol v. Equitable Life Assur. Co., 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E.
506 (1892), the court, without denying that there may be property
in an idea, declared that upon disclosure it becomes the acquisition
of whomsoever receives it, unless some contract should regulate or
guard its disclosure.
7-Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gantz, 86 F. 2d 597 (1936).
Of course, where an idea has been reduced to some concrete
form, as in the shape of a literary production or the like, it then
comes within the protection of the common law as a property right
and may qualify as subject to patent or copyright under the federal
laws.
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provides a basis for equity jurisdiction, even if it be considered
73
that the idea itself is not property.
In the former situation equity has intervened to prevent
the breach of trust and confidence. 7 4 However, the breach of
76
7
trust and confidence must be clearly alleged 5 and proven.
In the latter situation, that of contract, the requirement has
been developed that the idea must be new, unusual and valuable.
If one of these elements is lacking," the contract will not be
enforced or its violation prevented. 77 Moreover, there is frequently the difficulty of proving the contract. 78 Many of the
cases, of course, are not suits for equitable relief but to recover
compensation for the use of the idea revealed in confidence or
pursuant to contract. However, injunction may frequently be
an appropriate remedy where it is sought to prevent the defendant from making an unauthorized use of the idea. And
where the idea has been made the basis of a patent or copyright
in the defendant's name after the idea has been obtained by
him through breach of confidence or contract, the originator
may seek to have a constructive trust impressed thereon in his
79
favor and, as well, an accounting for profits.
I Cf. Liggett & Myers Co. v. Myers, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N.E.
206 (1935), noted (1935) 15 B.U.L. REV. 633, (1936) CORN. L. Q. 486,
(1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1269, taking an advanced view as to an idea
being property.
" See Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 56 F. 2d 962 (1932).
Even here, some courts have held that only if the idea is the
subject of a contract can it be protected. Haskins v. Ryan, 75 N.J.
Eq. 330, 78 A. 566 (1908); Stein v. Morris, 120 Va. 390, 91 S.E.
177 (1917).
Although an employer-employee relationship could certainly
supply the necessary relationship of trust or confidence, it has been
held that the employee has a prior duty to disclose his idea to his
employer without charge. Keller v. American Chain Co., (1930)
255 N.Y. 94, 174 N.E. 74. Cf, Nat. Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240,
55 N.E. 2d 783 (1944).
Bristol v. Equitable Life Assur. Co., supra, n. 71.
Moore v. Ford Motor Car Co., 43 F. 2d 685 (1930),
'See
aff'ing (1928) 28 F. 2d 529.
Masline v. New York, etc., R.R. Co., 95 Conn. 702, 112 A. 639
(1921); Thomas v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 Pa. St. 262, 38

A. 2d 61, 157 A.L.R. 1432 (1944).

-1Grombach Productions v. Waring, 293 N.Y. 609, 59 N.E. 2d 425
(1944), noted (1945) 31 CORN. L. Q. 382, (1945) 40 Ill. L. REV. 130.
See comment, Ideas as subject matter of contract (1946) 31 CORN.
L. Q. 382.
See Becher v. Couture Laboratories, 279 U.S. 388, 49 S. Ct.
356, 73 L. Ed. 752 (1929) (breach of confidence by employee);
Bohlman v. American Paper Goods Co., 66 F. Supp. 828 (1946)
(alleged breach of contract and fraud).
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TRADEMARKS AND TRADENAMIs-UsE BY COMPETITORS

A trademark is some arbitrary name, symbol or device
affixed to goods for the purpose of identifying them as the goods
of a particular manufacturer or producer 0 or of one whose
established business is the selection and sale of an article of a
certain standard and quality. 8 ' A tradename, somewhat more
broadly, is the name used to designate the particular business
of an individual, corporation, partnership or the like, but it
'2
may also designate specific goods or articles of merciandise.
The same fundamental principles of law and equity are applicable to both trademarks .and tradenames despite any technical distinctions between them.8 3
When a trademark or tradename has been used in business

and the goods have become known to the public and sought for
and purchased under that particular mark or name, the trademark or tradename becomes a valuable adjunct or incident of the

business. Its value to the user in connection with an existing
business is in the nature of a property right.8 4 If a competitor
uses the mark or name he deceives the public into buying his
goods in the belief that they are those of the original user of
the trademark or tradename, to the competitor's own advantage
and to the consequent loss of business by the original user."
'o Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665,
21 S. Ct. 270, 45 L. Ed. 363 (1900); Italian Swiss Colony v. Italian
Vineyard Co., 158 Cal. 252, 110 P. 913, 32 L.R.A.N.S. 439 (1910).
" Menandez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 9 S. Ct. 143, 32 L. Ed. 526
(1888).
62
Direct Service Oil Co. v. Honzay, 211 Minn. 361, 2 N.W. 2d
434, 148 A.L.R. 1 (1941).
'Ball v. Broadway Bazaar, 194 N.Y. 429, 87 N.E. 674 (1909).
" Allen & Wheeler Co. v. Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S.
403, 36 S. Ct. 357, 60 L. Ed. 713 (1916).
It is thus distinguishable from a patent which gives a monopolistic property right without user; there is no property right in a
trademark or tradename not used in connection with an existing
business. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90,
39 S. Ct. 48, 63 L. Ed. 141 (1918),
"It is well established that a trade-mark or trade-name cannot
be licensed or assigned except as an incident to the sale of the business and good will in connection with which it is used." Purity
Cheese Co. v. Frank Ryser Co., 57 F. Supp. 102 (1944).
(If it could
be sold or transferred as a distinct property in itself it might be
used to designate, articles entirely different in origin or character
from those to which it was originally given and thus the public would
be deceived. Author.)
I While, among the older cases, various equitable grounds were
instanced as reasons for granting equitable relief, particularly the
fraud practiced on the public (see Chadwick v. Covell, 151 Mass.
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This wrongful appropriation of the property right of another
to his injury is an act of unfair competition. 86 Although
action of a legal nature, for damages, can be brought, it is obvious that this remedy is inadequate. The injury flows from
the continued invasion of the property right and only equitable
relief can restrain this continued invasion. 8
Equity can also,
of course, to the extent that it is feasible in the particular case,
award damages for the injury so far incurred or require an
accounting of profits made by the competitor through his
wrongful use of the trademark or tradename, according to the
practice in the particular jurisdiction.8 8
Except as may be provided by statutes authorizing or permitting registration of trademarks and tradenames,8 9 an ex190, 23 N.E. 1066, 6 L.R.A. 839, 21 Am. St. Rep. 442 (1890), at a
later date it became common to deny that fraud on the public is
ground for equitable relief and, instead, that the real reason is the
invasion of a property right, i.e., the exclusive right to the use of
the trademark or tradename, to the injury of the original user. See
G. & C. Merriam & Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369 (1912); Italian
Swiss Colony v. Italian Vineyard Co., supra, n. 80. There has now
been a return to recognition of the fraud on or deceit of the public
as an important factor in warranting equitable relief, but on the
basis that this fraud or deceit or, at least, creation of confusion in
the public mind is causing or will cause loss to the business of the
original user. This may be so even without actual intent on the
defendant's part to cause loss to the plaintiff. See Hartman v.
Cohen, 350 Pa. St. 41, 38 A. 2d 22 (1944), noted (1944) 30 IowA L.
REV. 120, (1944) 43 MIcH. L. REv. 409. See also cases in following
notes.
'-Allen & Wheeler Co. v. Hanover Star Milling Co., supra, n. 84
("the common law of trademarks is but a part of the broader law
of unfair competition"). See Glenn, Pre-emption in Connection
with Unfair Trade (1919) 19 COL. L. REV. 29; The Relation of the
Technical Trademark to the Law of Unfair Competition (1916) 29
HAHV. L. REV. 753.

The actual spelling or number of letters or syllables is not
determinative. If there is similarity in ordinary speech, that may
be sufficient. LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157
F. 2d 115 (1946).
""To establish infringement, plaintiff need show only that the
name adopted by defendants is so similar to its trade-mark as to be
likely to cause confusion among reasonably careful purchasers.
Defendants urge that there has been no showing of actual instances
of confusion; but no such evidence is required." LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., supra, n. 86.
'Liberty Oil Corp. v. Crolvley, Milner & Co., 270 Mich. 187,
258 N.W. 241, 96 A.L.R. 645 (1935); L. Martin Co. v. L. Martin &
Wilckes Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 257, 72 A. 294, 20 Ann. Cas. 57, 21 L.R.A.N.S.
526 (1908). See Nims, Damages and Accounting Procedurein Unfair
Competition Cases (1946) 31 CORN. L. Q. 431.
' The statutes of one's own state should be examined. Frequently thpy do not change the rule that use as well as selection
must be present.
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elusive right in a trademark or tradename is not acquired instantly, by mere selection. It must be used long enough to become identified in the public mind with the article or business
to which it is affixed. 90 But what is the territorial extent of
this public knowledge as related to sales of goods, articles or
services to which the mark or name is affixed? The rule has
been laid down that the use of the mark or name in one area
or territory confers no right to prevent its subsequent use by one
in the same business in an area or territory where the prior user
has not been selling the goods, articles or services to which his
mark or name is affixed. As the United States Supreme Court
put it, the trademark "of itself, cannot travel to markets where
there is no article to wear the badge and no trader to offer the
article." 91 Such a rule is based, obviously, on the fact that in
the latter territory the public is unaware of the goods, articles
or services of the prior user doing business elsewhere and, thus,
does not identify or associate the mark or name with his goods.
articles or services. 92 However, it is now well recognized that
one who first appropriates a trademark or tradename may enjoin its use by a subsequent user even in an area or territory
where the senior appropriator is not selling his goods, articles
or services, if the public there, or even any appreciable portion
of the public, identifies or associates the mark or name with
the business of the senior appropriator. This has variously
or cumulatively been put upon such grounds as that the senior
appropriator's good reputation is known in the area or territory
"Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 59 S. Ct.
109, 83 L. Ed. 73 (1938), rehearing denied 305 U.S. 674, 59 S. Ct.
246, 83 L. Ed. 437 (1938), noted (1939) 24 CoRN. L. Q. 255.
To what extent a preliminary advertising campaign will or will
not supply this identification, see Upjohn Co. v. Wm. S. Merrell Co.,
269 Fed. 209 (1920); Gotham Music Service, Inc. v. Benton & Haskins
Music Pub. Co., 259 N.Y. 86, 181 N.E. 57 (1932).
"Allen & Wheeler Co. v. Hanover Star Milling Co., supra, n. 84;
Griesdieck Brewery Co. v. Peoples Brewery Co., 56 F. Supp. 600
(1944); Yellow Cab Co. v. Sachs, 191 Cal. 238, 216 P. 33, 28 A.L.R.
105 (1923); Direct Service Oil Co. v. Honzay, supra, n. 82; REST.,
TORTS, Sec. 732, comment a.
No attempt is made in this article to discuss what constitutes
an area or territory. See cases, annotation, 148 A.L.R. 12, at p.
104 et seq.
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., supra, n. 84.
Registration of a trademark under the Federal Trademark Act
does not alter the rule or extend the rights delimited by equitable
principles. Griesdieck Brewery Co. v. Peoples Brewery, Co., supra,
n. 91.
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where he does not operate and the subsequent appropriator is
seeking to take advantage of that reputation for his own profit,
that the subsequent appropriator is acting in bad faith to deceive
the public, that the senior appropriator's reputation may suffer
injury, or that there is some inimical design, as to forestall expansion of the senior appropriator's business to the area or
3
territoryY
A trademark or tradename must be a proper one. It is
therefore necessary, in adopting one, to select one which no one
else will thereafter have an equal right to use. 94 An entirely
original or invented name, word, device or symbol, known as a
pure or technical trademark, may answer this requirement. 95
Ordinarily, no name which is merely descriptive of the qualities
of an article can be appropriated as a trademark or tradename. 96
Likewise, ordinarily, words and phrases in common use cannot
be appropriated2 7 Nevertheless, words of description or ordinary use may, from long and exclusive use, come to be so associated or identified in the public mind with the source or origin
of the goods to which they are affixed that they have what is
"Stork Restaurant v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90 (1941); Good

Housekeeping Shop v. Smitter, 254 Mich. 592, 236 N.W. 872 (1931);
REST., TORTS, Sec. 732. And see Brooks Bros. v. Brooks Clothing of
California, 60 F. Supp. 442 (1945).
See comment, Protection Accorded to Prior User (1946) 19 So.
CAL. L. REV. 272; annotation, 148 A.L.R. 12.
' See Franklin Knitting Mills v. Fashionit Sweater Mills, 297
Fed. 217 (1923).
Abandonment of trademark, see note (1935) 22 VA. L. REV. 102.
'E.g., the word "Kodak". But compare invention of word, such
as "aspirin" or "cellophane", used in connection with a patented
article and becoming of common usage so as to be available to anyone when the patent expires. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272
Fed. 505 (1921); Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co.,
85 F. 2d 75 (1936).
" Whole Grain Wheat Distributing Co. v. Bon Marche, 154 Wash.
455, 282 P. 914 (1929); REST., TORTS, Sec. 721.
Applied even where the name as used by defendant was falsely
descriptive of his product. American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw
Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (1900). It is hard to see what equities exist
in the defendant's favor in such a situation.
Foreign word, see Italian Swiss Colony v. Italian Vineyard Co.,
supra, n. 80.
Phonetic spelling of descriptive word does not change the
principle applied. Lusta-Foame Co. v. Win. Filene's Sons Co., 66 F.
Supp. 517 (1946).

'Purity Spring Water Co. v. Redwood Ice Co., 203 Cal. 286,
263 P. 810 (1928); REST., TORTS, Sec. 721.
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termed a "secondary meaning", so that their subsequent use by
98
another on a similar product will be enjoined.
While a mere color or shape of a container cannot be appropriated as a trademark, 9 9 an original combination of several
things or words may constitute a protectible trademark.' 0 0
Although it has formerly been stated that no one can acquire
an exclusive right to a merely geographic name, certain exceptions have been developed. When one has truly applied the
name of his town or district to his goods and they have become
known by that name, he will be protected as against one whose
goods are produced elsewhere and which have falsely affixed to
them the same name in order that they may pass as the goods
made by the original user of the name.' 0 ' Even where the subsequent use is by a competitor who has established himself in the
same town or district, the subsequent user may be enjoined from
using the same geographic name because it has acquired a
"secondary meaning" or, at least, required to distinguish his
goods from those of the first user so that the public may not be
deceived and the first user injured.'0 2
A kindred question arises as to how far one may use his own
name as a trademark or tradename so as to be protected against
the use of the same or a similar name by another. 10 3 It is conceded that a person cannot acquire an exclusive right to the use
of his mere name as against another of the same name. A second
'Wisconsin Electric Co. v. Dumore, 35 F. 2d 555 (1929), cert.
denied 282 U.S. 813, 51 S. Ct. 214, 75 L. Ed. 728 (1931).
"To entitle a private party to equitable relief, there must be
wrong added to incidental confusion in the use of similar names,
such as fraud, deception, or palming off, or the name which has
sought to protect must have acquired a secondary meaning." General
Industries Co. v. 20 Wacker Drive Bldg. Corp., 156 F. 2d 474 (1946).
See comment note, Doctrine of Secondary Meaning in Law of
Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 150 A.L.R. 1067.

"Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. Mosesian, 84 Cal. App. 485, 258
P. 630 (1927).
"'Lusta-Foame Co. v. Wm. Filene's Sons Co., 66 F. Supp. 517
REST., TORTS, Sec. 724.
"I'La Republic Francaise

(1946);

v. Saratoga Vichy Springs Co., 107
Fed. 459, 65 L.R.A. 830 (1901), aff'd 191 U.S. 427, 24 S. Ct. 145, 48
L. Ed. 247 (1903).
"'American Waltham Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co.,
173 Mass. 85, 53 N.E. 141, 43 L.R.A. 826, 73 Am. St. Rep. 263 (1899).
'See
annotations, Right, in absence of self-imposed restraint,
to use one's own name for business purposes to detriment of another
using the same or similar name, 47 A.L.R. 1189, 107 A.L.R. 1279.
In respect of corporations, see annotations, 115 A.L.R. 1241, 66
A.L.R. 948.
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comer in the field has the right to use his name to identify his
business or goods so long as he does not thereby deceive the public or others to the detriment of the first user.' 04 However, if
the second comer resorts to any further imitation or to any
artifice whatever, calculated to represent his goods as being those
of the first user, he will be enjoined. 10 5 Indeed, if the name of
the prior user has become so well associated in the public mind
with his goods that confusion is unavoidable, the court may require the second comer to distinguish or identify his goods in
such way that the confusion or mistake will be prevented. 10 6
One will, of course, be protected against the use of his name by
persons not bearing the name. In such case, assumption of his
name is without any pretence of right.' 0 7 Protection will also
be accorded against one not of the same name who makes a point
of employing or associating with him someone of the same name
as the prior user, in order to take advantage of the good will and
reputation, of the prior user. 108
A trademark may be infringed without imitating it, as
where a dealer in response to requests for a particular trademarked article of plaintiff hands over another's product,10 9 or
where a dealer removes identifying labels, marks or the like from
" Ida May Co. v. Ida May Ensign, 20 Cal. App. 2d 339, 66 P. 2d
727 (1937).
"',
Sellers v. McCormick, 19 Del. Ch. 238, 165 A. 569 (1933); L.
Martin Co. v. L. Martin & Wilckes Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 257, 72 A. 294,
20 Ann. Cas. 57, 21 L.R.A.N.S. 526 (1908); Flora v. Flora Shirt Co.,
141 Okla. 58, 283 P. 1013 (1930).
Where defendant's use of his own name was motivated by desire
to divert business from plaintiff and he could not use his own name

without inevitably confusing public, his use of his name was ab-

solutely enjoined. Hoyt Heater Co. v. Hoyt, 68 Cal. App. 2d 523, 157
P. 2d 657 (1945), noted (1946) 59 HARV. L. REV. 140.
"' Waterman Pen Co. v. Modern Pen Co., 235 U.S. 88, 35 S. Ct.
91, 59 L. Ed. 142 (1914); Brown Sheet Iron & Steel Co. v. Brown
Steel Tank Co., 269 N.W. 633, 107 A.L.R. 1276 (Minn. 1936).

"' See Brooks Bros. v. Brooks Clothing of California, 60 F.Supp.
442 (1945).
"'DeNobili Cigar Co. v.Nobile Cigar Co., 56 F. 2d 324 (1932),
noted (1932) 31 MICH. L. REV. 292.
""Barnes v.Pierce, 164 Fed. 214 (1908).
In Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co. v. Wendover, 43 Fed. 420, 10
L.R.A. 283 (1890), plaintiff, who made a soap known as "Sapolio",
proved that on several occasions -customers who asked for Sapolio
were handed the soap of a different maker which was marked
"Pride of the Kitchen" and was not in a package not resembling
that of plaintiff's soap.
As to products of another placed in container bearing plaintiff's
mark or name, see annotation; 60 A.L.R. 285.
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the plaintiff's goods and sells them as the product of another or
as his own product.1 10 In this respect, litigation frequently results from the sale of repaired or reconditioned goods. The
dealer may be removing the trademark and selling the reconditioned or repaired goods as his own or another's product, 11 ' or
he may be leaving the trademark on the goods but selling them
as, or in a manner to lead to the belief that they are, new
goods.'112
It is an essential of a valid trademark that it contain no
false statement as to the character of the article itself, or as to
the person by whom or the place where it is made. No property
right can be asserted in such a false statement and it would be
contrary to public policy for equity to lend its aid to one who is
deceiving the public. 113 It is not necessary that the deception
should inhere in the trademark itself. If misleading words or
symbols are used in connection with it, the trademark will not
be protected." 4 Similarly, the use of a trademark or tradename
in connection with a business which is in its nature illegal or
contrary to public policy will not be protected in equity."n
TRADEARKS AND TRADENA-MES-USE By NONCOMPETITORS

Formerly, since the term "unfair competition" was considered to presuppose actual competition of some kind, equitable
relief was not available against one who used another's trademark or tradename on distinctly different articles, goods or
11 0

Jantzen Knitting Mills v. A. Balmuth, Inc., 257 N.Y.S. 611

(1932).

I Injunction granted to prevent infringement of trademark by
one dealing in repaired goods, but dealer permitted to identify origin
of goods. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 56 F. Supp. 782,
787 (1944), noted (1944) 34 GEORGETOWN L. J. 118.
11Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, supra, n. 111.
I Clinton E. Worden & Co. v. California Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S.
516, 23 S. Ct. 161, 47 L. Ed. 282 (1903).
"Applied in case of a "fruit" pudding sold under the name of
"Puddine" which, as analysis showed, contained no fruit. ClotWorthy v. 8hepp, 42 Fed. 62 (1890).
Affiliated Enterprises v. Gantz, 86 F. 2d 595 (1936); Affiliated
Enlerprises v. Gruber, 86 F. 2d 958 (1936). In these cases, plaintiff sought to establish protectible property right in use of term "Bank
Night" in connection with a scheme which court considered in
nature of a lottery. Incidentally, in 1938, plaintiff discontinued
operations when a fraud order was issued against it by the Post
Office Department.
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services. 110 There being no actual competition it was evidently
believed that there could be no loss of business to the prior user
of the mark or name which would supply the property -injury
which in some form is so frequently said to be a necessary elewent of equity jurisdiction.
Probably one of the earliest, if not the earliest, American
departure from this view is to be found in a case involving the
famous inventor, Thomas A. Edison. Edison sought to enjoin
the unauthorized use of his name and picture on a drug manufactured and sold by the defendant. Obviously hard pressed
to find precedent to justify the giving of equitable relief, the
court touched upon such matters as whether there was a property right in a name or a picture or in reputation, as well as
upon the right of privacy, without obtaining any fully satisfactory justification therefrom for relief. Analysis of the
(,ourt's opinion shows its decision to give equitable relief to be
based on the view that one's name and reputation come to have
a pecuniary value in connection with one's business, in the
nature of a property right, and that reasonable probability of
future injury results from the unauthorized use of a name, even
7
by a noncompetitor.11
When it is considered that the prior user of a mark or name
has no control over the subsequent user's methods of doing business or the quality of the goods, articles or services that he dispenses, it is plain that the prior user is at the mercy of one who
may discredit the mark or the name in the mind of the public,
whose dissatisfaction or ill will may thereupon attach to every
article with that mark or name. Moreover, it is necessary to
consider that the subsequent user, though a noncompetitor, is
usually intentionally and deliberately attempting to profit himself, in deceit of the public, by appropriating to his own benefit
the good will and the business value of an established mark or
name. So far as the equities are concerned, they are all on the
"This
seems to be stated as the rule in NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION (2d ed.), Sec. 221; WALSH, TREATISE ON EQUITy, Sec. 46.
"7Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A.
392 (1907), wherein the injunction extended to the use of Edison's
name in the name of the defendant company. Compare Edison v.
Thomas A. Edison, Jr., Chemical Co., 128 Fed. 957 (1904), where
injunction was denied against use of name "Edison," though de-.
fendants were admittedly injuring Edison's business reputation.
The court did not recognize the right to enjoin "defamation" injurious to business.
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side of the prior user. It is now well settled that, even though
there is no actual market competition, where one passes off his
goods, services or his business as the goods, services or business
of another, equity will intervene, to protect the good will and
business reputation of the latter from any injury liable to be
caused thereby." 8
So far as concerns the territorial extent of protection in the
case of subsequent use by a noncompetitor, it will be found that
the same rules govern as in the case of a subsequent use by an
actual competitor. 119
It will have been noticed that even where subsequent use of
a mark or name is by a noncompetitor, nevertheless both parties
are engaged in business or commerce of some kind. It is the
probability of pecuniary damage to the business of the first
user which justifies equity in giving relief. Can there be any
pecuniary damage resulting from the use of the mark or name
of one not engaged in business for profit? According to what
may be described as a leading case of some years ago, the answer
is in the negative. Vassar College sought to enjoin the LooseWiles Biscuit Company from using its name and a crude imitation of its college seal on boxes of chocolates which the defendant
sold under the name of "Vassar Chocolates". The court declared that there was no such property right in its name and
insignia, in the nature of a business right, to which any injury
was done so as to entitle it to injunctive relief. The injury, if
any, was described as being psychological rather than real and
the plaintiff was said to be oversensitive. 120
Oil Co. of New Mexico v. Standard Oil Co. of
"Standard
California, 56 F. 2d 973 (1932); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
v. A. & P. Radio Stores, 20 F. Supp. 703 (1937), noted (1938) 86
UNIV. OF PA. L. REv. 444; Academy of Motion Picture Arts and

Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal. 2d 685, 104 P. 2d 650 (1940); Colorado
Nat. Co. v. Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver, 95 Colo. 386, 36 P. 2d
454 (1934); Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, 317
Ill. App. 451, 46 N.E. 2d 165, 148 A.L.R. 6 (1943); Churchill Downs
Distilling Co. v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 262 Ky. 567, 90 S.W. 2d 1041
(1936), noted (1937) 25 KY. L. J. 280; H. Milgrim & Bros. v. Schlesinger, 168 Ore. 476, 123 P. 2d 196 (1942).

See annotation, Actual competition as necessary element of
trademark infringement or unfair competition, 148 A.L.R. 12; Note
(1925) 38 HARV. L. REV. 370.
1 See, e.g., Tillman & Bendel v. California Packing Corp. 63
F. 2d 498 (1933), certiorari denied 290 U.S. 638, 54 S. Ct. 55, 78 L. Ed.
554 (1933). And see supra, text and note 93.
" Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982 (1912).
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Nevertheless, the same factors and the same probabilities
are present in such a case as in the case where both parties are
engaged in busines for profit. The reputation of the plaintiff
may suffer, the public may conceivably be deceived, the defendant may be deliberately attempting to profit himself from the
established reputation and good will of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, though engaged in nonprofit activities, is usually dependent on continued public support and patronage, on continued
public good will. Injury to the plaintiff's reputation or otherwise can decrease public support and patronage to actual
pecuniary loss on the part of the plaintiff. And since the activities of the plaintiff will usually be educational, religious or
otherwise in the public benefit, the public may suffer an incalculable loss through diminution of the nonprofit activities.
This is by far the better view and is the modern view.' 2 1
DESIGN OR APPERANCE OF GOODS; BusnWEss SYSTEr

Closely akin to the matter of trademarks and tradenames is
that of design or appearance of goods. Where goods of a certain
design or appearance, although not protected by patent, in course
(f time become identified in the public mind with their manufacturer or source, the one responsible therefor is entitled to
equitable relief against another who subsequently simulates the
design or appearance for the purpose of deceiving the public
to his own benefit.' 22 Where the deception is flagrant or where
it is accompanied by other deceptions, such as the use of the same
mark or name or a similar mark or name, the defendant may be
enjoined from further simulation.' 23 Frequently, however, it
'" E.g., Academy of Motion
Picture Arts & Sciences v. Benson,
supra, n. 118.
'2 Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 16 S. Ct. 1002,
41 L. Ed. 118 (1895).
Copying structural design, form, shape and color of plaintiff's
taxicabs. Yellow Cab Co. v. Greasman, 185 N.C. 551, 177 S.E. 787,
28 A.L.R. 109 (1923).
As in the case of trademarks, the first user of a particular design
must have had it on the market for a sufficient length of time for
the public to become familiar with it as his product. Rathbone,
Sard & Co. v. Champion Steel Range Co., 189 Fed. 26, 37 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 258 (1911).
Ephemeral dress design, see Cheney Bros. v.
Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. 2d 279 (1929), certiorari denied 281 U.S.
728, 50 S. Ct. 245, 74 L. Ed. 1145 (1930), noted (1930) 30 CoL. L. REv.
135, (1930) 43 HAv. L. REV. 330, (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 617.
" Kyle v. Perfection Mattress Co., 127 Ala. 39, 28 So. 545, 50
L.R.A. 628, 85 Am. St. Rep. 78 (1900).
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is considered sufficient relief to require the defendant to mark
or identify his goods with sufficient clarity to show that they
are not those of the plaintiff.124 Indeed, one may usually avoid
charges of unfair competition made by a first comer by adequately marking or distinguishing his goods. 125 While some cases
hold to the contrary in respect to such voluntary marking, it will
usually be found that in such cases the marking was not actually
26
sufficient or in good faith.
It is immaterial that the simulation on the part of the
manufacturer or wholesaler of the goods will not deceive retail
dealers and that as to them no deception is attempted or practiced. If the former designedly enables the retail dealer to palm
off the simulated goods or articles as those of the plaintiff, it is
an act of unfair competition on the part of the manufacturer
or wholesaler. He who induces another to commit fraud and
27
furnishes the means is equally guilty.
With reference to a business system, the design or shape of
an article frequently continues to be important. The point is
that the first comer in the field-has built up the probability of
-future demand for a given article and subsequently a competitor produces, usually at a cheaper price and perhaps of inferior quality, parts which will fit into the article or system
devised and established by the first comer. Examples are the
"Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83, 59 N.E. 667 (1901).
See Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (1917).
" Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., supra, n. 124.
In Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 59 S. Ct.
109, 83 L. Ed. 73 (1938), it was held that reasonable means were
taken to distinguish the defendant's goods, where it sold shredded
wheat biscuits of the same shape as those of the plaintiff but they
were of a different size, there was a different number of biscuits
in the carton, and the carton was dissimilar and carried slightly
different name.
"In Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder, 154 Fed. 57 (1907), the
defendant copied all the external details of plaintiff's Yale lock but
put the word "Yap" on it in place of the word "Yale" and placed
its name and address on the shackle in the same sized letters used
by plaintiff. It will be noticed that the simulation was accompanied
by a name that might be easily misread as "Yale".
'Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder, supra, n. 126; American
Philatelic Soc. v. Claibourne, 3 Cal. 2d 689, 46 P. 2d 135 (1935),
noted (1936) 24 CAL. L. REV. 340, (1935) 34 MIIcH. L. REV. 296, (1936)
9 So. CAL. L. REV. 407, (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 428.
See annotation, Right to enjoin competitor from selling his
produce to dealers with whom plaintiff has exclusive contract or in
such form as to enable dealers to palm off competitor's produce on
customers as that of plaintiff, 84 A.L.R. 472.
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manufacture and sale of a system of sectional bookcases over a
long period of time whereupon, after the establishment of a demand therefor, a second comer in the field produced and sold
sectional bookcases of the same styles and sizes which could be
used to extend those already bought from the originator of the
system; ' ,s and the manufacture of a toy construction set,
named "2eccano", sold in various units, any one of which would
fit into and expand any of the others, whereupon, after a demand was established therefor, a second comer manufactured
and sold at a cheaper price a similar toy under a different name
but of the same dimensions which could be fitted into units of the
first eorer."-'1 The decisions were not entirely harmonious. In
the first example, although there was found to be an intent on
the defendant's part to deceive the public into thinking they
were buying the plaintiff's goods, equitable relief was denied.
The right of any one to produce goods and articles of a similar
nature, not the subject of patent, was asserted, despite the deeeption. In the second example, the deliberate attempt to palm
off the defendant's goods as those of the plaintiff warranted injunctive relief. The better view is undoubtedly that a second
comer is entitled to get the benefit of the demand created by the
first corner, so long as he does not intend to deceive the public
by passing off his goods as those of the first comer. If he is
proeeeding in good faith and clearly marks his goods to show
unmistakably that they are his and not the goods of the first
comer he may compete without equity's intervention.' 30
Although advertising may create popular demand for
articles of a particular nature, shape, size or form, it appears
that advertising alone does not entitle the advertiser to prevent
a competitor from beating him to the market and capitalizing
in this demand. 13 ' This can hardly be justified as an equitable
view where the advertiser has first originated the idea, has expended money on preparations for production and has expended
money on his advertising campaign and another unfairly attempts to capitalize on, the advertising to pass his goods off as
"Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Macey, 119 Fed. 696 (1902).
"Meccano, Ltd. v. Wagner, 234 Fed. 912 (1916).
1 See, e.g., Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, supra, n. 124.
'See Upjohn Co. v. Win. S. Merrell Co., 269 Fed. 209 (1920);
Gotham Music Service, Inc. v. Denton & Haskins Music Pub. Co.,
259 N.Y. 56, 181 N.E. 57 (1932).
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those advertised. Where both come into the field, in good faith,
at approximately the same time, it is another matter.
INTERFERENCE WVITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

Where the plaintiff, in the course of carrying on a lawful
business, enters into a contract with another and a stranger to
the contract deliberately seeks to induce the other contracting
party to breach the contract or otherwise seeks to interfere with
the contract to the irreparable injury of the plaintiff, the
stranger may be enjoined from interfering with the plaintiff's
business or with his rights under the contract, if a remedy by
way of damages is not adequate and complete. Not only is the
right to carry on a lawful business free from wrongful interference a right of property or a substantial right in the nature
of a property right, but the contract, with the rights thereunder,
is a property right. Accordingly, the property element is more
than adequately present to justify equitable consideration.' 3 The contracts may be those entered into with employees, or with
customers or with manufacturers or wholesalers, in short contracts lawfully and properly entered into for the purpose of
furthering the business.' It is immaterial that the contract is
terminable at will, even though terminable at the will of the
1
one induced to breach it. 33
*Where a competitor of the plaintiff seeks to induce the
breach of or interfere with the plaintiff's contracts with others,
it becomes an act of unfair competition, as where the competitor
seeks to induce customers of the plaintiff to breach their con34
tracts with the plaintiff and deal instead with the competitor,
"See annotation, Liability for procuring breach of contract,
84 A.L.R. 43; Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations (1928)
41 HARV. L. REV. 728.

The fact that in some jurisdictions there is said to be no right
of action for damages against one maliciously inducing breach of a
contract other than for employment and that the action for damages
resorted to must be against the party to the contract who breaches
it, provides ground for equitable relief, since there is no remedy at
law, at all, against one pursuing a deliberate or malicious course
of conduct to the irreparable injury of the plaintiff. Origin and
growth of action at law for damages, see Sayre, Inducing Breach of
Contract (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 663.
1E. L. Hustings Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 205 Wis. 356, 237 N.W. 85,
238 N.W. 626, 84 A.L.R. 22 (1931), certiorari denied 285 U.S. 538,
52 S. Ct. 311, 76 L. Ed. 931 (1932).
" California Grape Control Board v. California Produce Corp.,
4 Cal. App. 2d 242, 40 P. 2d 846 (1935); American Law Book Co.
v. Edward Thompson Co., 41 Misc. 396, 84 N.Y.S. 225 (1903).
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or where tife competitor seeks to induce one to breach a contract
lie has made with the plaintiff which gives the latter an exclusive
right or agency. 1 35, Where the act or acts complained of will
result in irreparable injury to the plaintiff, as will assuredly
be the ease where the conduct represents a continued course of
action, equity will enjoin the act or acts.1 3 6 The plaintiff, of
course, must not himself come into court with unclean hands, as
where he himself has been inducing customers to breach their
contracts with the defendant,1 37 or where he is carrying on a
business which is a fraud on the public, 135 or where the contract
is entered into for the purpose of restraining competition or
1
creating a monopoly, against the public interest. 39
So far as interference with contracts enters the field of labor
law or disputes, the matter is not within the scope of this article.
But it is proper to notice that a competitor may be enjoined
from a continued course of conduct of inducing employees of the
plaintiff to breach their contracts of employment, to the irreparable injury of the plaintiff. 14° Or in the case of an employee
whom the defendant has already induced to breach his contract,
1 , Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N.E. '817, 11 L.R.A.N.
S. 201, 122 Am. St. Rep. 232, 11 Ann. Cas. 332 (1907) (exclusive
agency); E. L. Hustings Co. v. Coca Cola Co., supra, n. 133 (exclusive
bottling and sales rights). Cf. Philadelphia Dairy Products v.
Quaker City Ice Cream Co., 306 Pa. St. 164, 159 A. 3, 84 A.L.R. 466
(1932).
In Montgomery Enterprises v. Empire Theatre Co., 204 Ala. 566,
86 So. 880, 19 A.L.R. 987 (1920), it does not specifically appear that
defendant induced the breach of an exclusive contract that plaintiff had for "first run" motion pictures, but defendant was enjoined
from knowingly profiting from such breach by showing such
pictures.
"See cases cited in two preceding notes.
", American Law Book Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., supra, n.
134.
'
American University v. Wood, 294 Ill. 186, 128 N.E. 330 (1920).
'Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, 31 S. Ct. 376, 55 L. Ed. 502 (1911); Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v.
Texas Electric Service Co., 63 F. 2d 702 (1933). Cf. Kinner v. Lake
Shore, etc., R. Co., 69 Oh. St. 339, 69 N.E. 614 (1903), where wrong,
if any, of the plaintiff, was said to have no connection with subject
matter of the action and thus not a bar.
""An interesting example of this was the attempt to enjoin the
Pasquel brothers, operators of a Mexican baseball league, and their
alleged agent, from inducing baseball players under contract with
the plaintiff to breach their contracts and go to Mexico to play
baseball. See Brooklyn Nat. League Baseball Co. v. Pasquel, 66 F.
Supp. 117 (1946.), wherein action-was dismissed.
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1 1
The emthe defendant may be enjoined from employing him.
ployee himself may be enjoined from working for another in
violation of his contract with the plaintiff where the employee's
services are of an unusual or unique nature and he has negativeanother during the period of his
ly covenanted not to work for
1 2
contract with the plaintiff.
Since the employee's power to earn a living is as important
to him as the carrying on of a lawful business is to the owner of
the business, the employee has a right recognized as a property
right which is entitled to protection by injunction against one
seeking to interfere with the employee's contract of employment
to the irreparable injury of the employee.' 4 3 The employee's own
conduct, of course, may be such as to render him guilty of coming into court with unclean hands and so not entitled to equitable
44
relief.1
DEFAmATION

As in the past, equity does not at the present time, except
as modified by the doctrine of the right of privacy, enjoin the
publication of defamatory matter which affects merely the personal reputation and personal character of the plaintiff. However, we are concerned here with whether equity will enjoin
publication of defamatory matter relative to the business of the
plaintiff or to his financial standing and so directly injurious
to him in his property.
In England when the matter became one of first impression,
it was pointed out that the business of a merchant is the most
valuable kind of property that he can have. A libel which would
injure his business reputation was declared to be an injury to
his property and equity had jurisdiction to protect him in his
property by enjoining the threatened publication. 145 Subsequently, the correctness of this view was denied, 14 6 and still
14Lumley v. Wagner, (1852) 1 De G. & Sm. 485, 64 Eng. Rep.
1209, aff'd (1852) 1 De G., M. & G. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687, followed
as the leading case on the subject.
" Lumley v. Wagner, supra, note 141.
''Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131, L.R.A.
1916D 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B 283 (1915).
.See Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., 269 Fed. 928, 15 A.L.R. 1209
(1920), certiorari denied 255 U.S. 569, 41 S. Ct. 423, 65 L. Ed. 790
(1921).
" Dixon v. Holaen, (1869) L.R. 7 Eq. 488.
"' Mulkern v. Ward, (1872) L.R. 13 Eq. 619.
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later was expressly overruled in Prudential Assurance Co. v.
KnIott,1 47 frequently cited and relied on in American decisions.
Nevertheless, there has been a return to the first view expressed,
under authority of the English Judicature Act of 1873, and

courts in England in the exercise of equitable powers enjoin
not only libelous publications but also oral slanders which injuriously affect one's business.14 s
In this country the courts for very long and with unanimity

refused to enjoin the publication of defamatory matter even
where it was clearly injurious to the plaintiff's business or business reputation. The chief ground for refusal was that the
constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and freedom of

the press would be interfered with or infringed.' 4 9 Another
ground, however, was the very force and weight of precedents
which had so long declared that equity did not enjoin defamatory
matter injurious to one's reputation that the courts were inclined to feel that this principle was settled even where injury
to business appeared. 5 0
This American view which was once so firmly established
has been whittled away*in some jurisdictions and attacked outright in others. 15 ' Some courts have declared that where libelous matter is an incident or part of an attack directed against
the plaintiff's business or is part of a plan to injure the plaintiff's business, the publication can be enjoined along with the
.. (1875)

10 Ch. App. 142.

"' Loog v. Bean, (1884) L.R. 26 Ch. D. 306, 316; Thorley's Cattle
Food Co. v. Massam, (1877) L.R. 6 Ch. D. 763. See also Bonnard
v. Perryman, (1891) 2 Ch. 269; Pound, Equitable Relief against
Defamation (1916) 29 HARV. L. REV. 665; annotation, 148 A.L.R. 853,
at p. 866.
'"Willis v. O'Connell, 231 Fed. 1004 (1916); Dailey v. Superior
Court, 112 Cal. 94, 44 P. 458, 32 L.R.A.N.S. 273, 53 Am. St. Rep. 160
(1896); Life Ass'n v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 173 (1876); Marlin Fire
Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163, 59 L.R.A. 310 (1902).
See annotation, 148 A.L.R. 853.
But once the plaintiff had established in an action at law that
the publication was libelous, he could then obtain an injunction
against further publication of it or similar matter which was shown
to be injurious to him in his business. Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke
Burner Co., 110 Mo. 492, 19 S.W. 804, 16 L.R.A. 243, 33 Am. St.
Rep. 476 (1892).
":Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69, 19 Am.
Rep. 310 (1873).
.' For excellent collection of cases, see annotation, Injunction
as remedy in case of trade libel, 148 A.L.R. 853.
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other incidents or parts.515' This has been especially true in
labor disputes where the false statements enjoined were said by
the court to be part of a plan to injure the employer's business. 153 The further view has been arrived at that, whatever
the view as to non-enjoinability of the publication of defamatory
matter injurious to personal reputation which may also be injurious to property or business, where the defamatory matter is
deliberately directed at the business itself or the articles, goods
or services dealt in and is thus classifiable as unfair competition
by a competitor or as an unjustifiable and wilful attempt at injury by a noncompetitor, injunction will issue against the publication.' 5 4 Thus it has become well established that defamatory
or false statements directed at the business or business rights of
the plaintiff will be enjoined where such statements are issued
for the purpose of persuading or inducing customers or the
public generally not to do business with the plaintiff, "55 or for
the purpose of intimidating them from doing business with the
plaintiff. 15 6 Some courts, in enjoining, as injurious, false state'Beck
v. Railway Teamsters Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497,
77 N.W. 17, 42 L.R.A. 407, 74 Am. St. Rep. 421 (1898); Gibraltar
Say. & Bldg. Ass'n v. Isbell, 101 S.W. 2d 1029 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
See also Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 357, 174 N.E. 357, 73 A.L.R. 669
(1931), per Cardozo, J.
' See Beck v. Railway Teamsters Protective Union, supra, n. 152.
In Magill Bros. v. Building Service Employees International
Union, 20 Cal. 2d 506, 127 P. 2d 542 (1942), the false and misleading
statements were on signs carried by pickets. The view of the court
seems to be that if the union members had sat at home and issued
the false statements there would have been nothing to enjoin; but
combining the publication of the false statements with picketing
warranted injunctive relief.
I Carter v. Knapp Motor Co. 243 Ala. 606, 11 So. 2d 383, 144
A.L.R. 1177 (1943); Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 536, 11 N.E. 2d 436
(1937), noted (1938) 24 VA. L. REv. 452, (1938) 17 TEx. L. REV. 97;
Yood v. Daly, 37 Oh. App. 574, 174 N.E. 779 (1930) (rule stated but
petition insufficient to state cause of action).
ICarter v. Knapp Motor Co., supra, n. 154; Menard v. Houle,
supra, n. 154; Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Pub. Co., 245
Mass. 262, 139 N.E. 655 (1923), noted (1923) 9 CORN. L. Q. 66.
An example of disparagement or defamation accomplished in a
negative manner appears in Davis v. New England Ry. Pub. Co.,
203 Mass. 470, 89 N.E. 565, 25 L.R.A.N.S. 1024, 133 Am. St. Rep.
318 (1909). Defendant published a list which purported to contain
the names of all reputable express companies in and around Boston
but deliberately and purposely omitted plaintiff's name from the list.
'Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46 (1888); Shoemaker v. South Bend
Spark Arrester Co., 135 Ind. 471, 35 N.E. 280, 22 L.R.A. 332 (1893).
See also American Mercury v. Chase, 13 F. 2d 224 (1926), noted
(1926) 25 MicH. L. REv. 74, where statements were made in good
faith by one not a competitor.
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meuts which are directed against a business or its products, have
termed the wrong a "disparagement of property" and by thus
avoiding the use of such terms as "libel", "slander", or "defamation", have neatly evaded many of the difficulties presented by precedent as represented in the older cases. 15 7 Others
designate the vrong a "trade libel" to differentiate it and to
justify giving equitable relief. 15 s
There is no sound reason why the publication or making of
defamatory statements, whether written or oral, should not be
enjoined where injurious to property rights, including the right
to carry on a lawful business and, as well, the right to earn a
living.',''
The gradual arrival at this point of view by the
American courts brings about uniformity in equity's protection
of property rights, particularly of the right to carry on a lawful business. 160
MISCELLANEOUS BUSINESS RIGHTS; MODERN DEVELOPMENTS

The growth and complexity of our economic life have
introduced many new assets or incidents of value into various
businosses. Indeed, a business today may be altogether based
til new facilities or processes not formerly existent. These are
See, e.g., Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leaker Press, Inc., 106
F. 2d 229 (1939), noted (1940) 40 COL. L. REV. 341, (1940) 25 IowA L.
REV. 668 (1940) 18 N.C. L. REV. 153. See also Smith, Disparagemerit of Property (1913) 13 COL. REV. 13, 121; Wham, Disparagement of Property (1926) 21 ILL. L. REV. 26; annotation; 144 A.L.R.
1181; notes, (1939) 38 COL. L. REV. 1291, (1939) 24 CORN. L. Q. 52.
'See, e.g., Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogany Ass'n, Inc., 129
F. 2d 227, 148 A.L.R. 841 (1941), and annotation, p. 853.
':

r'See WALSH, TREATISE ON EQUITY, Sec. 51.

"'"We are quite willing to repudiate the 'waning doctrine that
equity will not restrain the trade libel'. We are further willing to
do so directly and without hiding behind the other equitable principles put forward in some of the cases." Black & Yates, Inc. v.
Mahogany Ass'n, Inc., supra, n. 158.
"The defendant relies upon Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg.
Co. (see supra, n. 150), wherein it was held that equity jurisdiction
does not extend to cases of libel or slander or of false representations as to character or quality of the plaintiff's property or as to
his title thereto which involve no breach of trust or of contract.
... But later cases have held that equity will take jurisdiction where
there is a continuing course of unjustified and wrongful attack upon
the plaintiff motivated by actual malice, and causing damage to
-property rights as distinguished from 'injury to the personality affecting feelings' . . . even though false statements and false announcements are the means or among the means employed, and that
in such cases there is no adequate remedy at law." Menard v.
Houle, supra, n. 154. To same effect, Carter v. Knapp Motor Co.,
supra, n. 154.
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as much entitled to equitable protection as the better known or
older incidents or assets. 1 6 ' Illustrations of a recognition of this
162
motion
are found in the many recent cases involving radio,
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" An odd case is thatin which a newspaper conducting a puzzle
contest for purpose of increasing its circulation enjoined professional
puzzle solvers from soliciting participants to buy purported solutions,
on ground of wrongful interference with right to conduct lawful
business. Philadelphia Record Co. v. Leopold; 40 F. Supp. 346
(1941).
Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp.
490 (1938), noted (1939) 24 CORN. L. Q. 288, (1939) 27 GEo. L. J. 381,
(1938) 33 ILL. L. REV. 475, (1939) 24 IowA L. REV. 388, (1939) 23
MINN. L. REV. 395, (1939) 37 MICH. L. REV. 988, (1939) 17 TEX. L.

REv. 370, (1938) 25 VA. L. REv. 243; Twentieth Century Sporting
Club v. Transradio Press Service, 165 Misc. 71, 300 N.Y.S. 159 (1937),
noted (1938) 38 COL. L. REV. 530.
.1 Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255
App. Div. 459, 7 N.Y.S. 2d 845 (1938), noted (1939) 16 N.Y.U.L.Q.
503.
10 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,
39 S. Ct. 68, 63 L. Ed. 211, 2 A.L.R. 293 (1918), noted- (1918) 18
COL. L. REV. 257, (1919) 4 CORN. L. Q. 223, (1919) 32 HARV. L. REV.

566, (1919) 13 ILL. L. REV. 708, (1919) 17 MICH. L. REv. 490, (1919)
67 U. oF PA.L. REv. 191, (1919) 28 YALE L. J.387.

Similarly, as to rights in quotations collected by trading exchange, see Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 46
S. Ct. 367, 70 L. Ed. 750, 45 A.L.R. 1370 (1926).

" See annotation, Application of principles of unfair competition
to artistic or literary property, 19 A.L.R. 949.
'8 Distinctive style of nationally known orchestra leader as subject of exclusive radio contract, see Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp.
338 (1939); Waring v. WDAS, 327 Pa. St. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).

